Unintended Consequences: Latin
America
and the U.S. War on Drugs
By: Zachary Berger
COR 310-01
March 11, 2013
It
would be safe to say that the culture of the United States is one that
thoroughly enjoys its share of mind altering substances. Certainly they are not
alone in that respect, yet they do show impressive figures when it comes to the
consumption of drugs—there are about five million regular users of cocaine
alone in the U.S., with around $37 billion spent annually just on cocaine and
$150 billion on illegal drugs in total (Bagley, 2). All of these drugs are
being imported into the country under the nose of the U.S. government, the very
government that has spent several decades waging a hefty “War on Drugs”, a war that
has proven tedious, expensive, and rather fruitless despite the immense amount
of resources that have been poured into the campaign. Since time has shown that
this drug war is not having the desired impact on the drug trade as well as
consumption, and in fact is causing even more problems in some areas (both
domestic and foreign), there has been growing support from a number of places
to bring about the end of this costly battle.
Internationally, the illegal trading of drugs accounts
for a significant portion of the world’s overall trade, with the United States
being in the center of all the action. The government has been working
tirelessly since the 1970s to suppress the import of drugs, while at the same
time the populous of the U.S. acts as the largest single market for drugs in
the world. This has created a messy situation in which the United States has
gotten involved throughout the world just to combat the lucrative drug
business, with nowhere being a better example of how many complications this
has created than in Latin America where essentially all of the cocaine that
crosses the borders into the U.S. originates. Consequently, the United States
has inserted a strong military presence into the region and has made it a main
focus in its overall war on drugs.
In order to obtain a complete enough picture of the
current situation of the U.S. drug war—with specific attention to the
trafficking of cocaine—one needs to look at the situation from a number of
directions. Firstly, the United States has involved the governments of a myriad
of Latin American nations in an attempt to combat smuggling, so it is crucial
to examine the history of the relationship between some of these nations—most
notably Columbia—and the United States. Without a doubt another crucial aspect
of the scenario to examine is what these businesses are that produce and move
the cocaine, as well as how they have developed over time; this includes
operation structure, production methods, smuggling techniques, and much more.
An ample amount of research has been conducted into these trafficking networks,
how they are set up, and the manner in which they have adapted to increasingly
tighter and tighter security in the regions where they operate.
Very
closely related to that are the side-effects of the war on drugs—how has the
United States approach to this situation affected life in countries like
Columbia and Mexico. Inside these nations there exists a very real presence of
drug related violence and poverty—something not altogether unheard of within
certain parts of the United States. As the U.S. has increased its military
presence in the region and escalated its combative tactics over time, the
people of Latin America have been subjected to a significant amount of unfair
treatment on both sides and have been made victims of circumstances they have
little control over. There is a wealth of information from a variety of sources
regarding the ongoing struggles that the people of Latin America are battling
with on a day-to-day basis. In many ways it is the citizens of countries like
Columbia and Mexico who have had to experience the true fallout of this
anti-drug initiative and as such deserve a thorough examination considering
they are a major piece of the large and complex puzzle that is today’s cocaine
network.
Stemming
from this topic, it is worth delving into some detail regarding the equipment
and tactics that are an integral part of the operations on both sides of this
battle. Although this has been an ongoing conflict for several decades, more
than ever in the last ten years there has been reported a range of information
highlighting the resources at the disposal of cartels and gangs as well as the
United States government which have contributed in a big way to the stretching
out of this conflict. Much of the reason there has been such little success on
the part of the anti-drug effort has to do with the fact that these entities who
are moving the cocaine up from Latin America have well composed systems of
trafficking as well as access to high quality and advanced technology that
assists them in successfully trading drugs. Along the way there will be plenty
of discussion concerning the way in which technology plays into this whole
situation, both for and against the United States effort.
The
last direction from which this conflict should be examined, and the one from
which our journey into the heart of it begins, is from an overall insight into
the world of drugs as it exists concerning the United States. Many of the
sources who shall be mentioned here offer a clear look into the way drugs
(specifically cocaine) effects the culture of the United States—why they are
treated the way they are and how it got that way. There are plenty of nations
across the globe who attempt to battle the influx of drugs across the borders,
yet none put forth quite the same amount of effort as the United States.
Compiled in this review is an abundance of research which explores the
motivation of the United States government and the lengths it has gone to in an
attempt to eradicate the presence of illegal drugs. But one thing that will be
hard to ignore is the fact that there seems to be agreement amongst scholars,
journalists, researchers of all kinds—even some government officials
themselves—that the war on drugs has proved rather ineffective and the
discussion of what the alternative solution should be is still developing.
Time
to examine the status of illegal substances in the United States and the effect
they have on the general populous: there are a substantial amount of people in
the U.S. who use drugs recreationally. Bruce Bagley, a professor and chair of
the Department of International Studies at the University of Miami, writes:
Many
Latin American political leaders have long argued that if the U.S. population
did not consume such large quantities of illegal drugs—if there were not so
many American drug addicts and users—then Latin American and Caribbean
countries would not produce such large quantities illegal drugs like marijuana,
cocaine, and heroin for export and the region would not be plagued by the
powerful and well-financed drug trafficking organizations (p. 1)
Certainly the situation
is a considerable amount more complicated and the blame can’t simply be put on
the users alone and in order to understand that it is important to look at
numbers across the board in regards to American drug consumption. The Cato Institute
offers a handbook to members of Congress in which the institute makes
recommendations on how Congress should approach certain policies—it also
provides excellent facts concerning the situation at hand:
Drug
enforcement costs about $19 billion a year now in federal spending alone. Those
billions have had some effect. Total drug arrests are now more than 1.5 million
a year. Since 1989 more people have been incarcerated for drug offenses than
for all violent crimes combined. There are now 400,000 drug offenders in jail
and prisons, and more than 60 percent of the federal prison population consists
of drug offenders. (p. 172)
These numbers become
even more staggering when it is taken into consideration that they are
constant—despite ongoing drug prevention efforts the number of arrests remain
enormous as does the related budget.
One of, if not the most important moments in the
relationship between the United States and drugs can be followed back several
decades to the days of the Nixon Administration which—as the Cato Handbook
mentions—was the implementation of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. In
many ways, the manner in which the U.S. drugs war and, consequently, the Latin
American cocaine network have developed since the 1970s can be attributed directly
to the passing of the CSA. A vehement argument is constructed within the
handbook stressing the importance of repealing the CSA, which it describes as
“the most far-reaching federal statute in American history, since it asserts
federal jurisdiction over every drug offense in the United States, no matter
how small or local in scope” (p. 173). The first reason for nullifying the act
given by Cato is that the act is “constitutionally dubious” and that “Congress
never asked the American people for additional constitutional powers to declare
a war on drug consumers”. A valid argument, but it is the next scenario
outlined in the handbook that really provides a powerful message.
More significant than any other implication of the drug
war—which essentially began with the passing of the Controlled Substances
Act—is the staggering amount of crime which surrounds the policy. The Cato
Handbook sketches the scene:
Second,
drug prohibition creates high levels of crime. Addicts commit crimes to pay for
a habit that would be easily affordable if it were legal. Police sources have
estimated that as much as half the property crime in some major cities is
committed by drug users. More dramatic, because drugs are illegal, participants
in the drug trade cannot go to court to settle disputes, whether between buyer
and seller or between rival sellers. When black-market contracts are breached,
the result is often some form of violent sanction, which usually leads to
retaliation and open warfare in the streets. (p. 173)
Other powerful points
are addressed here, including an argument that in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attack, the 9,000 employees of the Drug Enforcement Agency would be
of more use to the United States by being involved in counterterrorism
operations.
While these arguments certainly have some weight to them,
the clearest reason why the CSA should be wiped off the table, as Cato suggests
once again, is the effect it would have on crime. “Drug prohibition channels
more than $40 billion a year into the criminal underworld” the handbook reads,
it then continues by making comparisons to the prohibition of alcohol in the
1920s, “alcohol prohibition drove reputable companies into other industries or
out of business altogether, which paved the way for mobsters to make millions
on the black market. If drugs were legal, organized crime would stand to lose
billions of dollars, and drugs would be sold by legitimate businesses in an
open marketplace" (p. 174). These arguments that Cato has mustered up are
not flimsy by any means and offer serious insight into why the CSA and the war
on drugs actually are detrimental to the society of the United States.
Chaos. Just from this brief look into the state of drug
policy enforcement within the borders of the U.S. it appears to be a situation
running out of hand—theft, violence, wasted money, arrests, corrupt businesses
and no foreseeable changes in sight. While all of this seems grim enough to a
U.S. citizen concerned with the well-being of their nation, this is all
relatively pale in comparison to the impact the drug war has had in Latin
America. With the substantial amount of drugs—cocaine specifically—that is
produced and moved from these countries, it is understandable that the U.S.
would concentrate much of its effort to this part of the globe. Important to
note, however, is the fact that the cocaine networks have become increasingly
complex as the battle against them amplifies. Columbia provides a great window
into the development of the massive cocaine networks currently operating
throughout Latin America as it shows how and why drug organizations were able
to thrive. While over time the structure of these organizations—often referred
to as “cartels”—has changed, it is beneficial to examine the history of
Columbia because it has been a central part of the drug war and how trafficking
functions.
As mentioned before, the Cato Handbook describes a
consequence of the CSA and the drug war as fueling crime and illegal drug
businesses—but this isn’t just evident in the United States. Going back to the
1970s, with the Controlled Substance Act and with drug enforcement policies
beginning to be carried out, it is easy to see how at this time in Columbia
there were people who were more than ready to jump at this new business
opportunity. While this marked the beginning of a glorious business venture for
some, the general populous in Columbia was now about to enter a long and
tumultuous period as the growth of cartels threatened the stability of the
nation. Winifred Tate is a researcher at Brown University and has conducted
ample amounts of research regarding international policy in Columbia among
other things; on Foreign Policy In Focus—an academic institution with an online
presence—Tate published a thorough examination of the Columbia’s cartel
history, “in the late 1970s, Colombia’s new cartels, first in Medellin and then
in Cali, expanded from marijuana to the processing and export of cocaine. Led
by a small number of powerful drug kingpins, these family-based empires came to
control a billion-dollar cocaine industry that processed coca grown primarily
in Bolivia and Peru” (fpif.org). It is these cartels that were largely
responsible for creating the system of trafficking which has beset practically
every country between the United States and Columbia for the past forty years.
Over time as the power and influence of the cartels grew, the violence
and corruption they caused became so prevalent that even the government started
to be targeted and suffered at their hands. Tate, in her post Colombia's Role in International Drug
Industry, described the
state of Columbia during the late 1970s and earlier 1980s as a hostile and
dangerous one:
The power and violence of the drug industry came to
permeate all facets of Colombian society…Drug lords achieved unprecedented
political influence through threats, bribery, and political contributions. Drug
violence also undermined Colombia’s formal but deeply exclusionary democracy,
particularly during the 1980s, when the Medellin Cartel waged war on the
Colombian government, killing hundreds of judges, police investigators,
journalists, and public figures. (fpif.org)
Because no legitimate
businesses for drugs could sprout up in the United States, the profit to be
gained by the Columbian cartels was massive, by the end of the 1970s cocaine
was being processed for $1,500/kilo in the jungles of Columbia, Bolivia and
Peru and then sold in the U.S. for $50,000 per kilo—a massive profit margin
(pbs.org). Such a large amount of money was now flowing into the Medellin and
Cali cartels that their ability to influence what happened in Columba was
strong, strong enough that the government could do nothing but suffer along with
average Columbian civilians. A senior economist at the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development in Washington D.C. named William Paul
McGreevey—who also is the author of An
Economic History of Columbia—wrote on Britannica of the terror the cartels
caused:
In 1982…Belisario Betancur
Cuartas, the Conservative candidate, was elected president. His presidency was
marred by extremes of violence that tested Colombia’s long-term commitment to
democracy. In 1984 individuals linked to the international drug trade
assassinated the minister of justice. The next year M-19
guerrillas entered the Palace of Justice in Bogotá and took scores of hostages;
when the military assaulted the building, some 100 people were killed,
including half of the Supreme Court judges.
The ability of the
cartels to have their way was seemingly unshakable—the demand for cocaine in
the United States was high in the 1980s, and as the profit was so immense they
managed to improve upon the methods of smuggling by “re-investing into more
sophisticated labs, better airplanes and even an island in the Caribbean where
the planes could refuel” (pbs.org).
During this period of increasing cartel strength and
influence in Columbia, perhaps because of the significant level of violence threatened
and committed, that they managed to find a foothold in the government.
Conditions deteriorated; cartels were using money and violence to achieve their
goals while at the same time guerilla groups comprised of those who were upset
with the government and their inability to deal appropriately with the cartels
among other issues began to disrupt life even further in Columbia, “As
a result, homicide became the leading cause of death in the country and 1989
was the most violent year in Colombia’s brutal history” (McGreevey). Tate
summarizes the extent to which violence and corruption riddled Columbia:
Paramilitary organizations—supported by drug
traffickers—have carried out more generalized violence in rural areas against
the civilian population. Since the early 1980s, drug traffickers, together with
landowners and local military commanders, have formed paramilitary
organizations to “clean” their territory of guerrillas and alleged guerrilla
sympathizers and to protect land, cattle, and cocaine laboratories and
strategic shipping routes. During the 1990s, ties between illicit drug
operations and paramilitary organizations solidified, with several paramilitary
chiefs becoming high-level traffickers…The U.S. State Department estimates that
paramilitary forces are responsible for more than 70% of Colombia’s human
rights abuses.
Whatever remained of
Columbia’s democracy had little ability left to change the mess that was
Columbia in the 1980s; battered by corruption and violence—now from more
directions than just the cartels—Columbia became the poster child for the
extent to which the cocaine network could impact the well-being of a country.
Allowed to thrive as drug production in the U.S. was stifled by the drug war, the
Columbian cartels amassed an incredible amount of wealth and influence by
capitalizing on the opportunity given to them by the U.S. government.
Interestingly enough, during the 1980s—which was the
height of power for these cartels—only a small percentage of the exported
cocaine was processed within Columbia, with the majority coming from Peru and
Bolivia to Columbia for export. Bagley writes, “As of 1985, Peru produced
roughly 65 percent of the world’s supply of cocoa leaf while Bolivia produced
approximately 25 percent and Columbia 10 percent or less” (pg. 3). Over the
next decade or so, the trafficking network that sprouted in Columbia by the
Cali and Medellin cartels would undergo some serious changes as 1989 saw the
beginning of the “Andean Strategy” in which “U.S. funds, equipment,
logistical support, and personnel from the DEA, the CIA, and other agencies
have played a leading role in counter-narcotics operations in Colombia” (Tate).
Attention
must be paid to the Andean Strategy and the intervention of the United States
in these South American countries because it was a crucial period in regards to
transforming the trafficking system of Latin America into the network seen
today. After about two decades
contributing to the root of Columbia’s woes via the war on drugs, the United
States finally stepped in during the early 1990s and supported the Columbian
government’s war against Pablo Escobar, the vicious leader of the Medellin
Cartel—also contributing to his death in 1993 as well as the imprisonment of
the leaders of the Cali Cartel (Tate). Bagley calls it a “partial victory” (p.
3) for the drug war, Columbia was at
last rid of two major drug entities who had devastated the government as well
as much of the civilian population—yet the Andean Strategy, as Bagley suggests,
wasn’t a complete triumph. Taking a step over into Peru and Bolivia, Tate
discusses that thanks to crop eradication efforts financed by the United States
“cultivation in Colombia increased
54% from 1996 to 1998, leaving overall Andean coca production constant.”
Certainly Bagley wasn’t wrong when he described the Andean Strategy as a
partial victory, considering the restructuring and strengthening of the cocaine
network that followed the minor successes in Peru and Bolivia.
Following
the eradication of the two major Columbian cartels, the process of cocaine
trafficking from the region underwent a significant change—one that would have
serious implications up to the current day, not just in Columbia, but in a
myriad of other nations within the western hemisphere. Tate gives a broad
explanation of what happened in her post, it reads:
The breakup of the two largest cartels did not lead
to a long-term decline in Colombian drug trafficking. These drug syndicates
have since been replaced by smaller, more vertically integrated trafficking
organizations whose nimble, independent traffickers are much more difficult to
detect and infiltrate. These traffickers employ new and constantly changing
shipping routes through Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean for moving
cocaine and, increasingly, heroin.
Due to the extremely
profitable nature of the cocaine trade, it is not a surprise that other
operations were ready to spring into action, Bagley writes “some 300 plus
smaller drug trafficking organizations (known as cartelitos) surfaced to fill the vacuum left by the dismantling of
the two major cartels in the political economy of Columbia’s still highly
profitable drug trade” (p. 4).
An
attempt to cleanse Columbia of what appeared to be a scourge upon the nation
turned out to have a significant downside—with the major cartels no longer in
power, the drug related violence within Columbia actually increased. Two new
groups emerged at this time to take control of the coca cultivation and
processing: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia—a left-wing guerrilla
group—and the right-wing United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia; “drug related
violence increased between these two armed illegal actors as each sought to
eliminate the other and to consolidate its own territorial control over drug
cultivation regions and the peasant growers across the Columbian countryside”
(Bagley, 4). Conditions deteriorated so significantly in Columbia during the
years following the new millennium it became as Bagley describes, “one of the
most dangerous and violent countries in the world”.
Now
approaches the heart of the current controversy surrounding the war on
drugs—from the fall of the two major Columbian cartels sprouted another topic
of concern and is a major reason why researchers such as Tate deem the war on
drugs as a failure, it’s called the “Balloon Effect” (Bagley, 5). It is a
moniker that has popped up in news articles (Arce, Bajak, Burke, Lopez,
Ruiz-Goiriena, 2013) scholarly journals, etc.—Bagley delves deep into the
matter, describing what it is and why it happened. First, a simple metaphor:
when you squeeze one a water balloon the water moves to fill other parts of the
balloon. The United States cracked down on the Columbian cartels that were
largely responsible for the whole cocaine trafficking process, but rather than
dismantling the operation altogether, cocaine production merely spread out to
other locations and became more complex and less centralized to any one
operation. Bagley writes, “As an unintended consequence of the U.S.-backed “war
on drugs” in Columbia, the locus of organized criminal involvement in cocaine
trafficking gradually shifted northward from Columbia to Mexico” (p. 5).
If
the mess that was made out of Columbia during the 1980s and 1990s wasn’t enough
to warrant a new approach towards drugs by the United States, the events occurring
in Mexico within the last decade should certainly speak volumes. Once Mexican
cartels gained control of the cocaine network “and trafficking routes shifted
from Florida to the U.S.-Mexico border” (Arce, Bajak, Burke, Lopez, Ruiz-Goiriena,
2013) the entire drug war spiraled wildly out of hand. Starting in 2008, the
United States and Mexican President Felipe Calderon “waged an intense military
campaign against Mexico’s drug cartels” (Bagley, 7). Called the Merida
Initiative—a 4-year plan costing $1.6 billion—militarized forces in Mexico
increased substantially; yet what has come out of this initiative appears only
to be a more complex and certainly bloodier smuggling operation, with killings
in Mexico reaching over 70,000 since 2006 (Arce, Bajak, Burke, Lopez,
Ruiz-Goiriena, 2013).
Yet with the employment of the Merida Initiative, we see
the return of the Balloon Effect, “the idea that drug activity squeezed out of
one neighborhood or region will simply bulge into another, like air in a
balloon” (Lyons, 2012). Due to the intensified security and “the traffickers
constant, successful adaptations to law enforcement measures designed to end
their activities have led to the more progressive contamination of more and more
countries in the region by the drug trade and its attendant criminality and
violence” (Bagley, 7). Seeking a new and safer way to smuggle cocaine into the
United States, Mexican organizations have shifted towards weaker nations in
Central America such as Guatemala and Honduras. “‘Now, all of a
sudden, the tide has turned,’ said Brick Scoggins, who manages the Defense
Department's counter-narcotics programs in most of Latin America and the
Caribbean. ‘I'd say northern tier
countries of El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Belize have become a key
focus area’" (Arce, Bajak, Burke,
Lopez, Ruiz-Goiriena, 2013). Confirmation regarding smuggling activity in these
new countries can be found in a report from the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP), in which they outline specific routes taken to move cocaine up
from South America into the United States, even including more countries like
Panama, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Appearing from all this is a ceaseless
chain-reaction in which no finite solution is currently being decided upon to
stop it—if one area has tightened security then the cocaine operation spreads
out to less secure areas and before long the majority of nations in Latin
America have found themselves involved in the war on drugs.
Resulting
all the way back to the Andean Strategy, “the major drug trafficking networks
in Mexico took advantage of the vacuum left in the drug trade to gain control
of cocaine smuggling operations from Columbia into the United States” (Bagley,
5). As seen in Columbia during the 80s, inevitably conflict accompanies the
illegal business of drug smuggling and “consequently drug-related violence and
criminality shifted northward into Mexican territory as various Mexican
trafficking organizations vied for control over the highly lucrative smuggling
trade from Columbia and the southern Andes into the large and profitable U.S.
market” (p. 5). It has become increasingly clear that
over
the past twenty-five years and more, the war on drugs conducted by the United
States and its various Latin America and Caribbean allies has succeeded
repeatedly in shifting coca cultivation from one area to another in the Andes
and in forcing frequent changes in smuggling routes. It has proven unable to
disrupt seriously, much less stop permanently, either production or trafficking
in the hemisphere. (Bagley, 7)
This situation in Latin
America has turned so chaotic and messy that by the end of last year, President
Calderon was actually quoted as saying drug consumption and trafficking is
“impossible” to end (T.W., 2012). Calderon’s comments add him to the growing
list of people in the western hemisphere who believe the United States is
fighting a battle it cannot win in Latin America.
When taking a look at the thoroughness and the complexity
of the routes created for cocaine to flow through on its way to the United
States, as well as the resources at the disposal of the cartels, it is no
wonder the fight has been so difficult. Described in a 2010 report from the
ONDCP, different methods of transporting cocaine include aircrafts that often
stop frequently between Columbia and Mexico to refuel and go-fasts which are
speed and luxury vessels used in the Pacific and Atlantic to carry cocaine;
“Using both light aircraft and go-fast boats, cocaine can be moved northward in
an endless series of combinations, touching down in areas the police rarely
visit (ONDCP, 2010). In addition to the complexity facing the U.S. and Latin
American security forces in attempts to intercept these boats and aircrafts,
recently “American authorities have discovered at least three models of a new
and sophisticated drug-trafficking submarine capable of traveling completely
underwater from South America to the coast of the United States” (Schimdt,
Shanker, 2012). These submarines are highly effective at transporting cocaine
to the United States, they are difficult to detect and the “fully submersible
vessels already captured were capable of hauling 10 tons of cocaine and,
by surfacing at night to charge their batteries off the onboard diesel engine,
could sail beneath the surface all the way from Ecuador to Los Angeles”
(Schmidt, Shanker, 2012).
When taken into account just how lucrative the U.S. drug
market is, there should be little surprise that the Mexican cartels currently
running the cocaine business harbor enough purchasing power to supply
themselves with submarines, aircrafts, boats, weapons, fuel, etc. Money equals
power and enough money gets funneled into the cartels that we have seen the
impact on the quality of life they can have in the nations in which they are
present. Violence and corruption riddled Columbia in the 1970s-1990s, causing
their economy and government to become stagnant in the face of powerful
cartels. Today the same is apparent in Mexico as the presidency of Calderon has
become marked by the drug war (T.W., 2012), all stemming from the U.S. war on
drugs. It shouldn’t be forgotten the negative impact that this has had within
the United States either—massive amounts of drug related arrests, gang
violence, and theft have become prevalent in the society of the U.S.; it could
even be said that the attempt to curb drug use and production in the United
States has made life harder but it is truly the citizens of Latin
America—particularly Columbia and Mexico—who truly suffer in the shadow of the
war on drugs.
Consensus is starting to seem rather clear as we move
deeper into the fifth decade of this conflict—the drug war isn’t working. Drug
use isn’t being stopped and therefor cartels have no reason to cease production
as the profit is too large to refuse. Tate vehemently writes, “The
U.S. should recognize that its war on drugs against Colombia and other “source
countries” has been a failure and that it must refocus on demand-reduction at
home through education and treatment”. During his scholarly piece about the
drug war and the related U.S. policies Bagley writes, “U.S. insistence on such
a policy approach has not only led to overall failure in the ‘war on drugs’
over the last twenty-five years plus; it has been counterproductive for both
U.S. and Latin American country interests” (p. 13). Even U.S. officials can’t
give confident statements regarding the militarized manner in which they
approach the drug war: “‘it’s not for me to say if it's the correct strategy.
It's the strategy we are using,’ said Scoggins. ‘I don't know what the
alternative is’" (Arce, Bajak,
Burke, Lopez, Ruiz-Goiriena, 2013).
While perhaps the
government of the United States isn’t actively seeking an alternative method of
handling drug consumption and production, there are certainly plenty of other
individuals (such as Tate and Bagley) and organizations that are attempting to
pursue a different course of action. A perfect example is the Drug Policy
Alliance, “the nation's leading organization promoting alternatives to current
drug policy that are grounded in science, compassion, health and human rights”
(drugpolicy.org). Another great organization working towards new solutions is
Global Commission on Drug Policy, it reads on their homepage:
The purpose of The Global
Commission on Drug Policy is to bring to the international level an informed,
science-based discussion about humane and effective ways to reduce the harm
caused by drugs to people and societies…There is a growing perception that the
‘war on drugs’ approach has failed. Eradication of production and
criminalization of consumption did not reduce drug traffic and drug use. In
many countries the harm caused by drug prohibition in terms of corruption,
violence and violation of human rights largely exceeds the harm caused by
drugs. (globalcomissionondrugs.org)
When there are multiple organizations, some
internationally based, along with academic scholars as well as heads of state
(Felipe Calderon) who are openly advocating an end to the war on drugs and the
development of a new approach, it should speak volumes about the state of
things. America’s war on drugs has proven difficult, bloody and expensive, all
while decreasing the quality of life for many on an international scale. Truly
this is a conflict which began with the right intentions in mind, but more than
fifty years later the U.S. government should be able to take a step back, look
at the state of things, and admit defeat honorably while at the same time
constructing a new and more effective strategy for dealing with domestic drug
consumption in order to begin improving the lives of its own citizens, as well
as those of Latin America.
Works
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"Cocaine:
The New Front Lines." WSJ.Com. The Wall Street Journal, 14 Jan.
2012. Web. 12 Feb. 2013.
"Columbian
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"Drug
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